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Abstract	  	  Mirror	  neuron	  research	  has	  come	  a	  long	  way	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  many	  theorists	  are	  now	  stressing	  the	  heterogeneity	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  sensorimotor	  properties	  of	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits.	  However,	  core	  aspects	  of	  the	  initial	  ‘mirror	  mechanism’	  theory,	  i.e.	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  symmetric	  encapsulated	  mirroring	  function	  translating	  sensory	  action	  perceptions	  into	  motor	  formats,	  still	  appears	  to	  be	  shaping	  much	  of	  the	  debate.	  This	  article	  challenges	  the	  empirical	  plausibility	  of	  the	  sensorimotor	  segregation	  implicit	  in	  the	  original	  mirror	  metaphor.	  It	  is	  proposed	  instead	  that	  the	  teleological	  organization	  found	  in	  the	  broader	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  might	  be	  inherently	  sensorimotor.	  Thus	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  independent	  ‘purely	  perceptual’	  goal	  understanding	  process	  is	  questioned.	  Further,	  it	  is	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  often	  asymmetric,	  heterogeneous	  and	  contextually	  modulated	  mirror	  and	  canonical	  neurons	  support	  a	  function	  of	  multisensory	  mapping	  and	  tracking	  of	  the	  perceiving	  agents	  affordance	  space.	  Such	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  interpretative	  framework	  offers	  a	  different	  theoretical	  handle	  on	  how	  sensorimotor	  processes	  might	  ground	  various	  aspects	  of	  intentional	  action	  choice	  and	  social	  cognition.	  Mirror	  neurons	  would	  under	  the	  proposed	  “social	  affordance	  model”	  be	  seen	  as	  dynamic	  parts	  of	  larger	  circuits,	  which	  support	  tracking	  of	  currently	  shared	  and	  competing	  action	  possibilities.	  These	  circuits	  support	  action	  selection	  processes—but	  also	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  options	  and	  action	  potentials	  that	  we	  and	  perhaps	  others	  have	  in	  the	  affordance	  space.	  In	  terms	  of	  social	  cognition	  ‘mirror’	  circuits	  might	  thus	  help	  us	  understand	  not	  only	  the	  intentional	  actions	  others	  are	  actually	  performing—but	  also	  what	  they	  could	  have	  done,	  did	  not	  do	  and	  might	  do	  shortly.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  caricature	  view	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  the	  ensuing	  debate	  	  Mirror	  neurons	  were	  initially	  discovered	  by	  Giacomo	  Rizzolatti	  and	  colleagues	  in	  Parma	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992,	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996	  and	  Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1996)[1].	  The	  core	  finding	  that	  inspired	  the	  name	  was	  that	  certain	  single	  cells	  in	  the	  macaque	  premotor	  cortex	  were	  modulated	  both	  by	  the	  execution	  of	  some	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  and	  by	  the	  perception	  of	  others	  performing	  similar	  actions.	  Such	  action-­‐sensitive	  sensorimotor	  modulations	  were	  also	  found	  in	  parietal	  areas	  known	  to	  be	  highly	  anatomically	  and	  functionally	  interconnected	  with	  the	  premotor	  area	  F5.	  Additionally,	  indirect	  behavioral	  and	  imaging	  findings	  suggested	  homologue	  modulations	  in	  humans.	  The	  Parma	  group	  soon	  hypothesized	  that	  these	  fronto-­‐parietal	  neurons	  together	  formed	  a	  mirror	  system	  by	  which	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we	  understand	  the	  perceived	  actions	  and	  perhaps	  intentions	  of	  others	  by	  mapping	  them	  onto	  our	  own	  motor	  system.	  Here	  a	  formulation	  from	  a	  1996	  article:	  	   These	   data	   suggest	   that	   area	   F5	   is	   endowed	   with	   an	   observation/execution	  matching	   system.	   When	   the	   monkey	   observes	   a	   motor	   action	   that	   belongs	   (or	  resembles)	   its	   movement	   repertoire,	   this	   action	   is	   automatically	   retrieved.	   The	  retrieved	   action	   is	   not	   necessarily	   executed.	   It	   is	   only	   represented	   in	   the	   motor	  system.	  We	  speculated	  that	  that	  this	  observation/execution	  mechanism	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  understanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  motor	  events.	  (Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1996,	  p.	  132)	  	  The	  central	  mirroring	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  perceived	  action	  is	  ‘matched’	  with	  the	  perceiver’s	  movement	  repertoire.	  Through	  the	  notion	  of	  observation/execution	  ‘mirroring’,	  ‘matching’	  ‘mapping’	  or	  ‘translation’,	  grew	  the	  idea	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  provide	  a	  relatively	  symmetric	  link	  between	  respectively	  (1)	  perception	  and	  action	  within	  the	  perceiver	  and	  (2)	  other	  and	  self,	  thus	  a	  social	  mirroring	  between	  subjects.	  (See	  also	  Uitol,	  van	  Rooij,	  Bekkering,	  &	  Haselager,	  2011a).	  Thus	  ‘mirroring’	  is	  seen	  as	  relating	  social	  and	  motor	  cognition,	  which,	  as	  recently	  suggested	  by	  Ferrari	  and	  Rizzolatti,	  has	  been	  incredibly	  important	  in	  igniting	  the	  interest	  in	  mirror	  neurons.	  [2]	  	  
1.1.	  Motor	  processes	  as	  ‘moonlighting’	  for	  perception?	  	  The	  discovery	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  the	  hypothesized	  ‘mirror	  mechanism’	  as	  sensorimotor	  mapping	  and	  motor	  simulation	  of	  perceived	  actions	  of	  others	  has	  generally	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  classical	  cognitivist	  ‘input-­‐cognition-­‐output’	  view3	  and	  as	  providing	  an	  ‘embodied’	  alternative	  (e.g.	  Gallese,	  2007).	  The	  idea	  being	  that	  mirroring	  as	  processes	  in	  motor	  formats	  (rather	  than	  a-­‐modal	  symbolic	  representations)	  functionally	  appear	  to	  serve	  not	  just	  the	  production	  of	  action	  outputs	  but	  social	  perception	  and	  central	  cognitive	  action	  understanding.	  Hitherto	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  had	  mainly	  been	  seen	  as	  supporting	  action	  planning	  and	  “perception	  for	  action”	  rather	  than	  “perception	  for	  understanding”[4].	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  discovery	  of	  mirror	  processes	  in	  motor	  ‘output’	  systems	  now	  contradicted	  the	  simple	  conception	  of	  forward-­‐flowing	  information	  processing	  from	  sensory	  modules	  to	  central	  cognition	  to	  action	  implementation,	  as	  motor	  neurons	  here	  might	  contribute	  to	  both	  action	  perception	  and	  central	  cognitive	  intention	  understanding.	  	  However,	  the	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  classic	  formulations	  of	  the	  mirror	  theory	  represent	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  modular	  input–output	  framework.	  Is	  not	  the	  output	  system	  of	  motor	  cognition	  here	  merely	  given	  an	  extra	  and	  separate	  job	  in	  service	  of	  cognition	  and	  social	  perception	  beyond	  its	  primary	  job	  in	  action	  execution?	  Is	  not	  this	  extra	  job	  theorized	  as	  based	  on	  a	  separate	  mechanism	  (i.e.	  mirroring),	  which	  might	  yield	  a	  cognitive	  understanding	  of	  goals	  and	  intentions	  behind	  the	  perceived	  action	  of	  others?	  The	  standard	  mirror	  neuron	  interpretation	  appears	  to	  maintain	  much	  of	  the	  core	  cognitivist	  structure,	  in	  particular	  the	  neat	  functional	  segregation	  between	  sensory	  and	  motor	  systems	  [5]	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  intention	  somehow	  being	  behind	  the	  actually	  performed	  action.	  [6]	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Over	  the	  last	  decades	  however,	  the	  picture	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  their	  functional	  place	  within	  the	  broader	  fronto-­‐parietal	  sensorimotor	  circuits	  has	  evolved	  tremendously.	  Many	  new	  studies	  have	  appeared,	  which	  together	  alert	  us	  to	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  and	  heterogeneous	  set	  of	  neurons	  and	  much	  less	  symmetric	  and	  modular	  population	  functions	  (see	  Casile,	  Caggiano,	  &	  Ferrari,	  2011	  for	  a	  review).	  While	  researchers	  in	  interesting	  ways	  have	  made	  adjustments	  to	  the	  classic	  mirror	  hypothesis,	  I	  see	  the	  basic	  framework	  as	  needing	  an	  explicit	  overhaul	  that	  matches	  the	  many	  new	  findings.	  I	  shall	  in	  this	  article	  first	  look	  at	  the	  plausibility	  of	  separate	  sensory	  and	  motor	  goal	  representations	  and	  then	  present	  some	  evidence	  for	  my	  proposed	  alternative	  social	  affordance	  space	  framework.	  [7]	  	  
1.2.	  Sensorimotor	  segregation	  in	  the	  current	  mirror	  neuron	  debate	  	  The	  original	  metaphor	  of	  mirroring	  contributed	  to	  what	  I	  propose	  is	  an	  empirically	  problematic	  and	  yet	  entrenched	  set	  of	  ideas:	  E.g.	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  (1)	  constitute	  a	  more	  or	  less	  encapsulated,	  non-­‐contextual	  mechanism	  which	  (2)	  provides	  a	  direct	  inner	  motor	  simulation	  of	  the	  actual	  actions	  of	  others	  and	  perhaps	  access	  motor	  intentions	  and	  meanings	  (Gallese	  and	  Goldman,	  1998	  and	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  As	  multimodal	  neurons	  with	  self-­‐other	  symmetric	  mirror-­‐like	  features	  were	  found	  also	  in	  somatosensory	  and	  visceral	  circuits	  (Keysers	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  this	  simulation	  frame	  was	  proposed	  as	  a	  possible	  unifying	  frame	  for	  social	  cognition	  (Gallese,	  2007	  and	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  core	  idea	  being	  that	  via	  the	  workings	  of	  multiple	  mirror	  systems	  we	  get	  something	  akin	  to	  an	  inner	  simulative	  ‘as	  if’	  1st	  person	  access	  to	  elements	  of	  an	  observed	  3rd	  person’s	  actions	  and	  perceptions.	  Several	  theorists	  have	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  encapsulation	  assumption	  (e.g.	  Kilner,	  Friston,	  &	  Frith,	  2007)	  and	  the	  simulation	  assumption	  (e.g.	  Gallagher,	  2007).	  	  However,	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  original	  mirror	  metaphor	  which	  has	  been	  less	  discussed	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  (3)	  mirror	  neurons	  provide	  a	  translation	  or	  mapping	  not	  only	  of	  self	  and	  other	  but	  also	  of	  two	  independently	  preexisting	  action	  formats	  (action	  as	  perceived	  vs.	  action	  as	  execution).	  I	  argue	  in	  the	  following	  that	  this	  is	  an	  empirically	  problematic	  idea,	  and	  further	  that	  these	  sensorimotor	  processes	  might	  be	  constitutive	  of	  teleological	  organizations	  rather	  than	  merely	  acting	  as	  bridging	  translators.	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  theoretical	  revisions	  of	  the	  original	  mirror	  hypothesis	  yield	  a	  different	  picture	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  to	  goal	  and	  intention	  understanding	  and	  social	  cognition	  in	  general.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  core	  disputes	  of	  the	  current	  mirror	  neuron	  debate	  center	  on	  how	  we	  are	  to	  conceptualize	  (1)	  what	  is	  mapped/shared,	  i.e.	  the	  content	  and	  level	  of	  abstraction	  of	  the	  observation/execution	  mirror	  mapping	  (	  de	  Vignemont	  &	  Haggard,	  2008),	  (2)	  how	  the	  information	  is	  processed—i.e.	  what	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  and	  transformations	  of	  the	  motor	  ‘simulation’	  are	  (	  Csibra,	  2007,	  Uitol	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  Uitol	  et	  al.,	  2011b	  and	  Hickok,	  2013),	  and	  (3)	  how	  a	  separate	  function	  might	  have	  evolved/developed	  to	  support	  social	  cognition	  (	  Heyes,	  2010).	  Lastly	  there	  is	  (4)	  the	  dispute	  over	  whether	  mirroring	  procedurally	  causes	  goal	  and	  intention	  understanding,	  or	  whether	  we	  must	  already	  have	  a	  perceptual	  understanding	  of	  these	  that	  can	  then	  be	  ‘fed	  into’	  the	  mirror	  mechanism.	  Some	  proponents	  of	  the	  former	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  simulation	  process,	  perhaps	  activating	  ‘action	  chains’	  (	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010),	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  motor	  or	  ‘embodied’	  action	  understanding	  that	  cannot	  be	  understood	  by	  purely	  perceptual	  means	  (	  Ferrari	  and	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Rizzolatti,	  2014,	  Gallese,	  2007	  and	  Gallese	  and	  Goldman,	  1998).	  Proponents	  of	  the	  latter	  often	  suggest	  that	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  has	  to	  do	  with	  anticipating	  sensorimotor	  consequences	  of	  own	  and	  perceived	  actions	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  action	  coordination	  and	  execution,	  and	  thus	  that	  their	  role	  in	  social	  cognition	  is	  accordingly	  limited.	  Further,	  it	  is	  highlighted	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  actions,	  which	  we	  cannot	  perform,	  and	  thus	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  other	  motor	  circuits	  might	  contribute	  to	  but	  are	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  action	  understanding	  (Csibra,	  2007,	  Hickok,	  2009,	  Hickok,	  2013,	  Jacob,	  2008	  and	  Jacob	  and	  Jeannerod,	  2005).	  [8]	  	  Each	  of	  these	  core	  disputes	  seems	  to	  rely	  on	  aspects	  of	  the	  caricature	  metaphor	  of	  mirroring.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  last	  question,	  about	  the	  how	  mirror	  neurons	  contribute	  to	  action	  and	  intention	  understanding,	  we	  see	  that	  both	  camps	  typically	  presume	  that	  perceptual	  processes	  are	  fundamentally	  distinct	  from	  motor	  processes.	  Further,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  this	  distinction,	  action	  intentions	  are	  seen	  as	  imperceptible	  [9].	  Thus	  most	  describe	  the	  actions	  of	  mirror	  and	  other	  sensorimotor	  neurons	  as	  “translating”,	  “mapping”	  or	  “linking”	  purely	  sensory	  onto	  purely	  motor	  goal	  representations.	  But	  the	  question	  is	  if	  these	  metaphoric	  descriptions	  are	  based	  on	  assumptions	  of	  sensorimotor	  segregation	  rather	  than	  empirical	  findings.	  I	  discuss	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  alternative,	  i.e.	  that	  cortical	  goal	  representations	  are	  inherently	  sensorimotor,	  and	  teleologically	  integrating	  actions	  and	  outcomes.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  article	  is	  to	  show	  how	  an	  abandonment	  of	  sensorimotor	  segregation,	  through	  e.g.	  a	  social	  affordance	  model,	  would	  change	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  current	  discussion.	  Firstly,	  it	  would	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  purely	  perceptual	  or	  purely	  motor	  goal	  understanding	  mechanism	  heralded	  by	  many	  within	  the	  debate	  (Csibra,	  2007	  and	  Hickok,	  2013).	  Secondly,	  it	  would	  change	  the	  hypothesized	  process	  of	  action	  understanding	  and	  also	  the	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  it.	  For	  example,	  instead	  of	  suggesting	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  simulation	  would	  help	  us	  see	  or	  infer	  the	  intentions	  behind	  the	  individual	  observed	  actions,	  the	  broader	  circuits	  might	  support	  a	  more	  perceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	  other’s	  action	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  available	  options—i.e.	  it	  would	  let	  us	  see	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  their	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Based	  on	  empirical	  findings,	  a	  ‘social	  affordance	  space’	  interpretation	  of	  the	  function	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  circuits	  is	  sketched.	  Fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  are	  here	  hypothesized	  as	  important	  for	  both	  ones	  own	  action	  choices	  and	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  others	  processes	  of	  intentional	  action	  choice.	  Note	  this	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  recognizing	  an	  action	  type	  or	  goal	  as	  has	  typically	  been	  the	  experimental	  focus,	  but	  understanding—and	  in	  the	  second	  person	  case	  influencing—the	  potential	  actions	  of	  others;	  i.e.	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  making.	  	  
2.	  Affordances	  and	  action	  selections	  in	  fronto-­parietal	  circuits	  	  The	  terminology	  of	  teleology	  has	  had	  quite	  a	  scientific	  revival	  over	  the	  last	  decades,	  as	  has	  the	  Gibsonian	  concept	  of	  affordances	  (Gibson,	  1979).	  In	  connection	  with	  the	  sensorimotor	  literature	  within	  neuroscience,	  the	  term	  teleology	  is	  typically	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  process	  that	  shows	  goal	  modulation.	  I	  shall	  use	  it	  as	  applying	  to	  any	  process	  organized	  around	  an	  expected	  distribution	  of	  outcomes.	  Thus	  not	  restricting	  the	  term	  to	  explicit	  representations	  of	  final	  goals	  or	  intentions	  but	  pertaining	  to	  purposiveness	  and	  outcome	  directedness	  more	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generally.	  In	  the	  sensorimotor	  context	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  it	  encompasses	  the	  entire	  hierarchy	  of	  future-­‐directed	  actions	  and	  processes	  organized	  around	  outcomes	  (Hamilton	  &	  Grafton,	  2007).	  	  Teleology	  as	  goal/target	  modulation	  had	  been	  documented	  in	  pre-­‐motor	  and	  parietal	  cortical	  areas,	  well	  before	  the	  discovery	  of	  mirror	  neurons.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  fronto-­‐parietal	  “reach”	  circuit	  where	  mirror	  neurons	  were	  first	  discovered,	  single	  cell	  studies	  had	  already	  revealed	  curiously	  teleological	  sensorimotor	  modulations.	  For	  example	  ‘object	  sensitive’	  or	  ‘canonical’	  neurons,	  which	  are	  multimodal	  neurons	  with	  visio-­‐motor	  (and	  often	  somatosensory)	  properties,	  which	  are	  modulated	  both	  in	  connection	  with	  action	  execution	  and	  during	  the	  presentation	  of	  complimentary	  objects	  or	  action	  targets.	  For	  example	  canonical	  neurons	  change	  their	  firing	  rate	  both	  when	  presented	  with	  a	  graspable	  object	  and	  when	  grasping	  such	  objects.	  Further,	  many	  such	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  in	  the	  period	  between	  stimuli	  exposure	  and	  action	  (set	  related)	  and	  when	  no	  actions	  are	  required	  (sustained	  activity)	  (Raos	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Rizzolatti	  and	  Gentilucci,	  1988,	  Sakata	  et	  al.,	  1995	  and	  Taira	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  	  The	  ‘affordance’	  notion	  has	  crept	  into	  use,	  as	  these	  canonical	  neurons	  seem	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  tracking	  of	  perceived	  objects	  in	  the	  surrounding	  environment	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  actions	  that	  they	  invite	  or	  ‘afford’	  the	  subject	  to	  do	  given	  their	  relative	  position	  and	  action	  repertoire	  (Grèzes,	  Armony,	  Rowe,	  &	  Passingham,	  2003)	  [10].	  Accordingly	  many	  findings	  of	  tool	  and	  learning	  dependent	  modulations	  highlight	  the	  roles	  of	  both	  ability	  and	  target	  accessibility	  (Berti	  and	  Frassinetti,	  2000,	  Bonini	  et	  al.,	  2014	  and	  Cardellicchio	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Such	  modulations	  of	  single	  neurons	  by	  visual	  perception	  of	  an	  object,	  and	  its	  unperceived	  presence	  in	  the	  dark	  and	  intentional	  actions	  toward	  such	  objects	  suggest	  that	  they	  integrate	  and/or	  anticipate	  the	  potential	  teleological	  relation	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  target—and	  might	  therefore	  support	  the	  perceptual	  categorization	  and	  tracking	  of	  the	  ‘afforded’	  action	  in	  respect	  to	  a	  target.	  Fagg	  and	  Arbib	  e.g.	  summarize	  their	  concept	  use	  as	  follows:	  “The	  term	  affordance	  is	  used	  to	  mean	  that	  visual	  cues	  are	  mapped	  directly	  to	  parameters	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  motor	  interaction”	  (Fagg	  &	  Arbib,	  1998).	  	  Some	  might	  hypothesize	  canonical	  neurons	  as	  not	  contributing	  to	  affordance	  perception	  per	  se,	  but	  rather	  as	  guiding	  the	  initiation	  of	  motor	  commands.	  However,	  as	  already	  mentioned,	  single-­‐cell	  recordings	  have	  shown	  affordance	  modulations	  in	  many	  such	  neurons	  when	  no	  action	  where	  required,	  as	  well	  as	  during	  delay	  periods	  between	  perception	  and	  action	  (Konen	  and	  Kastner,	  2008	  and	  Raos	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Further,	  findings	  of	  modulation	  in	  the	  dark	  suggest	  that	  this	  multimodal	  integration	  yields	  a	  broader	  tracking	  of	  environmental	  affordances	  than	  needed	  for	  guidance	  of	  actually	  performed	  actions.	  	  Hence	  this	  affordance-­‐related	  fronto-­‐parietal	  activity	  appears	  to	  support	  processes	  prior	  to	  the	  actual	  action	  initiation.	  Paul	  Cisek	  and	  John	  Kalaska	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  multiple	  sensorimotor	  affordances	  get	  specified	  in	  parallel	  until	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  the	  action	  selection	  process	  (	  Cisek,	  2007,	  Cisek	  and	  Kalaska,	  2002	  and	  Cisek	  and	  Kalaska,	  2010)	  [11].	  They	  proposed	  an	  “affordance	  competition	  hypothesis”	  for	  decision-­‐making	  in	  fronto-­‐parietal	  and	  related	  sub-­‐cortical	  circuits,	  which	  hypothesizes	  that	  these	  sensorimotor	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processes	  support	  not	  just	  perceptual	  attention	  and	  action	  specification	  but	  also	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  	  Interestingly,	  they	  explicitly	  contrast	  this	  view	  to	  traditional	  input–output	  information	  processing	  views.	  They	  high-­‐light	  the	  empirical	  problems	  of	  frameworks	  that	  segregate	  perceptual	  input	  and	  motor	  output	  systems,	  as	  they	  thereby	  locate	  cognition	  or	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  some	  black	  box	  between	  these	  (Cisek	  &	  Kalaska,	  2010).	  Fagg	  and	  Arbib	  and	  others	  have	  also	  explicitly	  described	  parietal	  areas	  as	  crucial	  for	  affordance	  tracking:	  “Visual	  information	  is	  processed	  in	  the	  posterior	  parietal	  cortex	  for	  the	  hypothesized	  purpose	  of	  extracting	  a	  variety	  of	  affordances	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  motor	  behavior”	  (Fagg	  &	  Arbib,	  1998).	  	  Similarly	  teleological	  visio-­‐motor	  properties	  have	  been	  studied	  and	  theorized	  quite	  intensely	  in	  connection	  with	  occulomotor	  attention	  and	  saccade	  tasks	  in	  other	  frontoparietal	  circuits	  (FEF-­‐LIP).	  These	  studies	  are	  generally	  interpreted	  as	  indicating	  a	  sensorimotor	  mapping	  and	  tracking	  of	  sometimes	  competing	  possible	  targets	  for	  intentional	  saccades	  in	  the	  environment.	  Further	  single	  cells	  were	  reported	  as	  also	  showing	  dynamic	  modulation	  according	  to	  motivational	  bias	  and	  more	  general	  valance	  features	  of	  the	  target	  for	  the	  subject	  (Gottlieb,	  2007	  and	  Mountcastle	  et	  al.,	  1975).	  	  There	  are	  many	  complexities	  pertaining	  to	  timing	  and	  divisions	  of	  labor	  within	  various	  premotor	  and	  parietal	  areas,	  left–right	  lateralizations,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  intricate	  massively	  parallel	  sub-­‐cortical	  sections	  of	  these	  circuits	  (Caligiore,	  Pezzulo,	  Miall,	  &	  Baldassarre,	  2013).	  However	  for	  current	  purposes	  I	  merely	  stress	  that	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  much	  was	  already	  known	  about	  multiple	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  supporting	  processes	  not	  only	  of	  action	  initiation	  but	  also	  of	  selection,	  and	  parallel	  affordance	  trackings	  of	  perceived	  options.	  Further	  the	  areas	  have	  been	  theorized	  as	  involved	  in	  spatial	  attention	  task	  and	  the	  planning	  and	  selection	  of	  visually	  guided	  actions	  and	  saccades	  (Andersen	  and	  Cui,	  2009,	  Cisek	  and	  Kalaska,	  2010	  and	  Fagg	  and	  Arbib,	  1998).	  	  Overall,	  the	  affordance	  related	  findings	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  perception	  as	  depending	  on	  relatively	  modular	  sensory	  ‘input’	  systems—and	  the	  idea	  that	  action	  selection	  and	  motor	  related	  processes	  functions	  uniquely	  to	  select	  and	  specify	  ‘outputs’.	  Many	  neuroscientists	  however	  continue	  to	  use	  a	  terminology	  of	  ‘translation’	  or	  ‘mapping’,	  indicating	  separate	  sensory	  and	  motor	  formats	  (Bach	  et	  al.,	  2011	  and	  Fagg	  and	  Arbib,	  1998).	  They	  thus	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  sensorimotor	  processes	  might	  change	  the	  very	  organization	  of	  the	  perception,	  and	  serve	  to	  constitute	  the	  goal	  representation	  rather	  than	  merely	  to	  translate	  it	  through	  linkage.	  	  
3.	  Are	  cortical	  motor	  systems	  inherently	  sensorimotor	  and	  teleological?	  	  Within	  the	  literature,	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “basically	  motor	  neurons”	  (Ferrari	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  2014).	  But	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  a	  neuron	  is	  ‘motor’	  or	  that	  mirror	  processes	  are	  part	  of	  the	  cortical	  motor	  system?	  Are	  parietal	  sensorimotor	  neurons	  motor	  neurons?	  Does	  not	  the	  very	  discovery	  of	  similar	  multimodal	  neurons	  in	  premotor	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blurred	  that	  previously	  thought?	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Luppino,	  2001)	  To	  understand	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  challenge	  to	  assumptions	  about	  sensory	  and	  motor	  segregation,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  look	  beyond	  both	  canonical	  and	  mirror	  neuron	  findings	  for	  a	  moment,	  to	  what	  is	  known	  about	  the	  organization	  of	  fronto-­‐parietal	  neurons	  more	  generally.	  	  Beyond	  the	  affordance	  aspect	  of	  so-­‐called	  canonical	  neurons	  Rizzolatti	  and	  colleagues	  proposed	  that	  many	  premotor	  neurons,	  also	  those	  modulated	  primarily	  by	  the	  monkeys	  own	  movement,	  had	  to	  be	  conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  goals	  and	  outcomes.	  They	  write:	  	   We	  became	  sure	  that	  goal	  was	  a	  necessary	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  class	  of	  neurons...There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  interpret	  these	  observations	  in	  terms	  of	  contractions	  of	   single	   muscles	   or	   muscular	   groups...the	   concept	   of	   aim	   was	   indispensable	   for	  explaining	   also	   the	   activity	   of	   neurons	   exclusively	   related	   to	   arm	   movements.	  (Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1987)	  	  Rizzolatti	  and	  colleagues	  in	  this	  way	  saw	  their	  work	  as	  challenging	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  uniform	  premotor	  cortex	  and	  also	  added	  to	  the	  mounting	  empirical	  challenges	  to	  the	  standard	  motor	  homunculus	  conceptions	  resulting	  from	  Penfield’s	  famous	  stimulation	  studies	  (Penfield	  &	  Rasmussen,	  1952).	  The	  view,	  which	  has	  now	  become	  more	  or	  less	  mainstream	  (Purves	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  is	  that	  not	  only	  premotor	  areas	  but	  even	  primary	  motor	  regions	  are	  organized	  not	  according	  to	  one	  detailed	  topological	  motor	  map	  of	  distal	  muscle	  groups	  and	  their	  efferents,	  but	  rather	  by	  way	  of	  several	  only	  grossly	  topological	  maps,	  each	  functionally	  organized	  around	  various	  sensory	  afferents	  (Strick	  &	  Preston,	  1982).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  anticipated	  sensory	  outcomes	  of	  actions	  seem	  to	  be	  key	  to	  the	  cortical	  motor	  organization.	  This	  view	  of	  cortical	  sensorimotor	  organization	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  vindication	  of	  William	  James’	  proposal	  from	  more	  than	  a	  century	  ago,	  where	  he	  denied	  Wundt’s	  “feeling	  of	  innervation”	  and	  wrote:	  	   …	  I	  cannot	  help	  thinking…that	  the	  discharge	  into	  the	  motor	  nerves	  is	  insentient,	  and	  that	  all	  our	  ideas	  of	  movement,	  including	  those	  of	  effort	  which	  it	  requires,	  as	  well	  as	  those	   of	   its	   direction,	   its	   extent,	   its	   strength,	   and	   its	   velocity,	   are	   images	   of	  peripheral	   sensations,	   either	   ‘remote,’	  or	   resident	   in	   the	  moving	  parts,	  or	   in	  other	  parts	  which	   sympathetically	   act	  with	   them	   in	   consequence	  of	   the	   ‘diffusive	  wave.’	  (James,	  1890,	  chap.	  26)	  	  Leaving	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  our	  actions	  aside,	  what	  I	  take	  from	  James	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  talk	  about	  cortical	  motor	  commands	  or	  ‘representations’	  independently	  of	  their	  anticipated	  sensory	  consequences?	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  should	  be	  the	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  that	  cortical	  motor	  areas	  are	  organized	  around	  various	  anticipated	  proprioceptive,	  somatosensory	  and	  other	  more	  distal	  sensory	  outcomes	  (with	  James	  terminology	  ‘resident’	  and	  ‘remote’	  peripheral	  sensations)?	  [12]	  	  One	  such	  implication	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  these	  circuits—both	  the	  granular	  and	  agranular	  sections—are	  inherently	  and	  inseparably	  sensorimotor	  in	  their	  organization.	  This	  is	  a	  rather	  important	  point	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  ‘motor	  cognition’	  is.	  I	  shall	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therefore	  give	  a	  little	  background	  on	  the	  typical	  anatomical	  reasons	  why	  primary	  and	  pre-­‐motor	  areas	  have	  been	  isolated	  as	  the	  seats	  of	  the	  cortical	  motor	  system	  and	  parietal	  regions	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  perceptual	  association	  areas.	  	  The	  classic	  divisions	  are	  based	  in	  part	  on	  electrically	  evoked	  behaviors	  through	  direct	  regional	  stimulation	  and	  upon	  cytoarchitectural	  evidence	  of	  the	  main	  distribution	  of	  cortico-­‐spinal	  and	  thalamic	  efferents	  and	  afferents	  documented.	  Interestingly,	  the	  classical	  frontal	  motor	  areas	  are	  known	  as	  the	  ‘agranular	  cortex’	  due	  to	  the	  relative	  absence	  of	  granular	  afferents	  (Solari	  &	  Stoner,	  2011).	  What	  we	  call	  primary	  and	  premotor	  cortical	  areas	  are	  thus	  in	  a	  sense	  defined	  negatively	  as	  cortical	  areas	  with	  a	  pronounced	  near	  absence	  of	  direct	  sensory	  afferents	  from	  the	  thalamus.	  However,	  given	  an	  input–output	  framework	  the	  most	  intuitive	  way	  to	  demarcate	  motor	  areas	  might	  be	  to	  look	  for	  efferents	  to	  sub-­‐cortical	  areas	  and	  the	  spinal	  cord.	  And	  most	  cortico-­‐spinal	  projections	  do	  indeed	  arise	  from	  classical	  primary	  motor	  and	  premotor	  areas—however	  some	  significant	  spinal	  projections	  also	  arise	  directly	  from	  within	  core	  sensory	  areas,	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  being	  from	  primary	  somatosensory	  subdivisions	  (Matyas	  et	  al.,	  2010	  and	  Rathelot	  and	  Strick,	  2009).	  	  The	  claim	  here	  is	  not	  that	  we	  cannot	  meaningfully	  distinguish	  these	  peripheral	  afferents	  and	  efferents.	  Rather	  the	  point	  is	  that	  at	  the	  level	  of	  organization,	  in	  cortical	  areas	  in	  particular,	  it	  becomes	  much	  harder	  to	  insist	  on	  anatomical	  regions	  as	  either	  pertaining	  to	  sensory	  or	  motor	  processes.	  There	  are	  significant	  functional	  and	  anatomical	  differences	  between	  say	  pre-­‐motor	  and	  parietal	  or	  somatosensory	  areas.	  However,	  evidence	  for	  any	  cortical	  pure	  motor	  organization	  appears	  to	  be	  lacking.	  Accordingly,	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘motor	  representations’	  and	  ‘motor	  cognition’	  might	  be	  misleading	  as	  we	  might	  be	  dealing	  with	  inherently	  sensorimotor	  conglomerates	  and	  indeed	  products	  of	  repeated	  sensorimotor	  feedback.	  	  Partially	  similar	  proposals	  have	  been	  made	  by	  e.g.	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘common	  coding’	  theory	  of	  action	  and	  perception.	  Schütz-­‐Bosbach	  and	  Prinz	  for	  example	  writes	  that	  the	  ideomotor	  principle	  implies	  that	  actions	  and	  perceptions	  are	  “coded	  in	  a	  common	  representational	  medium”	  (Hommel	  et	  al.,	  2001	  and	  Schütz-­‐Bosbach	  and	  Prinz,	  2007).	  They	  go	  on	  to	  summarize	  the	  association	  process	  and	  its	  use	  as	  follows:	  	   When	   a	   certain	   movement	   is	   performed,	   an	   association	   is	   created	   between	   the	  motor	  pattern	  it	  is	  generated	  by	  and	  the	  sensory	  effects	  it	  leads	  to.	  This	  association	  can	  then	  also	  be	  used	  in	  the	  reverse	  direction,	  such	  that	  a	  movement	  can	  be	  induced	  by	  anticipating	  or	  perceiving	  sensory	  effects	  (Schütz-­‐Bosbach	  &	  Prinz,	  2007,	  p.	  349).	  	  The	  question	  I	  have	  for	  the	  common	  coding	  theorists	  is	  how	  more	  precisely	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘associations’	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘directions’	  of	  anticipation	  referred	  to	  here.	  Similarly,	  among	  researchers	  inspired	  by	  studies	  of	  actions	  control	  and	  sensory	  feedback	  based	  prediction,	  the	  formulations	  of	  internal	  models,	  namely	  as	  ‘inverse’	  and	  ‘forward’	  simulations,	  appear	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  schematic	  that	  still	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  keeps	  cortical	  sensory	  and	  motor	  formats	  neatly	  divided	  (e.g.	  Miall,	  2003).	  [13]	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To	  exemplify	  the	  logical	  implications	  that	  sensorimotor	  segregation	  has	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  I	  quote	  from	  a	  recent	  article	  by	  Hickok:	  “…action	  understanding	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  by	  matching	  or	  simulating	  observed	  actions	  in	  one’s	  own	  motor	  system,	  as	  was	  once	  claimed,	  but	  by	  matching	  or	  simulating	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  actions”	  (Hickok,	  2013).	  Hickok	  thus	  distinguishes	  the	  simulation	  of	  actions	  and	  movements	  from	  goals.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  Csibra’s	  2007	  analysis,	  where	  he	  distinguishes	  action-­‐to-­‐goal	  simulation	  from	  goal-­‐to-­‐action	  and	  argues	  like	  Hickok	  that	  movement	  simulation	  does	  not	  yield	  goal	  and	  teleological	  reasoning	  unless	  we	  already	  understand	  it	  by	  other—likely	  purely	  perceptual—means.	  Hickok’s	  conclusion	  is	  similar	  and	  his	  reasoning	  quite	  fascinating	  given	  our	  present	  purposes:	  	   The	  question	  then	  becomes,	  how	  and	  where	  are	  the	  goals	  of	  an	  action	  coded	  in	  the	  brain?	   The	   answer	   is	   that	   the	   goal	   is	   encoded	   neurally	   as	   a	   sensory	   state...	   If	   the	  monkey	  were	   blindfolded	   and	   prevented	   from	   receiving	   somatosensory	   feedback,	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  movements	  he	  executed,	  accurately	  or	  not,	  the	  monkey	  would	  have	   no	  way	   to	   know	  whether	   the	   goal	  was	   achieved.	   The	  motor	   system	   alone	   is	  literally	  and	  figuratively	  blind	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  is	   incapable	  of	  understanding.	  The	  goals	  of	  an	  action	  are	  not	  in	  the	  actions	  themselves…they	  are	  in	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  these	  consequences	  are,	  for	  the	  range	  of	  actions	  we	  are	  considering	  here,	  sensory.	  Therefore,	  to	  understand	  an	  action,	  we	  must	  understand	  the	  sensory	  goal(s)of	   the	   action.	   Action	   understanding	   is	   a	   function	   of	   perceptual,	   not	   motor	  systems.	  (Hickok,	  2013,	  p.	  56)	  	  I	  could	  not	  agree	  more	  that	  the	  monkey	  needs	  sensory	  movement	  feedback.	  Similarly,	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  Jamesian	  point	  made	  here	  that	  the	  movements	  themselves	  are	  ‘blind’	  and	  that	  action	  consequences	  reveal	  themselves	  through	  re-­‐afferent	  processes.	  Hickok	  is	  also	  right	  in	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  somatosensory	  and	  proprioceptive	  feedback,	  which	  in	  many	  mirror	  neuron	  studies	  have	  been	  ignored	  and	  sensorimotor	  is	  often	  equated	  with	  visual-­‐motor	  [14].	  But	  the	  question	  is	  why	  Hickok	  assumes	  segregated	  sensory	  and	  motor	  systems?	  Why	  suggest	  that	  the	  goal	  ‘encoding’	  is	  purely	  sensory?	  And	  why	  assume	  that	  cortical	  motor	  systems	  are	  devoid	  of	  afferent	  organization	  and	  thus	  blind?	  As	  highlighted	  above	  anatomical	  evidence	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  support	  such	  segregations.	  Note	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  sensory	  and	  motor	  ‘states’	  and	  systems	  is	  what	  carries	  Hickok’s	  firm	  conclusion	  that	  goals	  are	  encoded	  in	  purely	  sensory	  non-­‐motor	  formats.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  ‘classical	  sandwich’	  assumptions	  can	  yield	  implausible	  implications	  even	  when	  based	  on	  otherwise	  valuable	  insights—here	  about	  goals	  and	  sensory	  afferents.	  	  In	  summary,	  mirror	  neurons	  have	  repeatedly	  been	  theorized	  as	  some	  sort	  of	  translational	  interface	  between	  action	  and	  perception	  (as	  well	  as	  between	  self	  and	  other).	  The	  question	  however	  is	  whether	  we	  have	  two	  functionally	  independent	  kinds	  of	  cortical	  representations	  or	  systems—sensory	  and	  motor—to	  translate	  between.	  I	  propose	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  might	  instead	  support	  an	  inherently	  sensorimotor	  functional	  organization	  that	  is	  anticipatory	  and	  feedback-­‐based	  in	  nature.	  Thus	  the	  evidence	  of	  parallel	  affordance	  tracking	  we	  saw	  earlier	  might	  indeed	  be	  “canonical”	  and	  revealing	  something	  central	  about	  the	  overall	  teleological	  organization	  of	  fronto-­‐parietal	  areas.	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To	  evaluate	  this	  idea	  a	  more	  detailed	  look	  will	  be	  needed	  at	  how	  mirror	  neurons	  findings	  contradict	  the	  caricature	  idea	  of	  an	  ‘observation/execution	  mirror	  matching	  mechanism’.	  We	  turn	  first	  to	  the	  questions	  of	  (1)	  whether	  mirror	  neurons	  like	  many	  other	  fronto-­‐parietal	  neurons	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  a	  teleologically	  organized,	  and	  (2)	  whether	  the	  goal	  modulation	  in	  the	  STS	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  purely	  perceptional.	  Then	  we	  interrogate	  the	  idea	  of	  (3)	  a	  relatively	  separate	  ‘mirroring’	  mechanism,	  and	  of	  (4)	  a	  symmetrical	  action-­‐perception	  self-­‐other	  modulation.	  Overall	  the	  findings	  of	  contextual	  dynamics,	  asymmetry	  and	  various	  heterogeneous	  goal	  and	  affordance	  modulations	  lead	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  a	  social	  affordance	  space	  mapping	  function	  in	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits.	  	  
4.	  Goal	  abstraction	  and	  intentional	  action	  compression	  	  Though	  the	  mirror	  metaphor	  suggests	  that	  the	  observed	  actions	  are	  mirrored,	  reproduced,	  or	  simulated	  in	  the	  motor	  systems	  of	  the	  observer,	  findings	  indicate	  that	  most	  of	  these	  action	  sensitive	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  goal	  or	  the	  anticipated	  outcome	  of	  the	  perceived	  action	  at	  some	  level	  of	  abstraction	  higher	  than	  perceived	  kinetic	  details.	  The	  idea	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  neurons	  are	  particularly	  tuned	  to	  goal-­‐oriented	  and	  intentional	  actions	  fits	  well	  with	  prior	  knowledge.	  Many	  later	  studies	  have	  now	  supported	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  most	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  target,	  goal,	  sub-­‐goal	  or	  expected	  outcome	  of	  actions	  (Bonini	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  Ocampo	  and	  Kritikos,	  2011	  and	  Umiltà	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Some	  findings	  suggest	  that	  different	  cortical	  areas	  are	  selective	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  goal	  abstraction	  and	  multiple	  parallel	  circuits	  have	  been	  proposed,	  of	  which	  some	  might	  provide	  a	  more	  precise	  mapping	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  Disparities	  between	  humans	  and	  non-­‐human	  primates	  have	  also	  been	  reported	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  transitive	  (goal	  directed)	  vs.	  intransitive	  actions	  (non	  object	  directed	  intentional	  actions,	  e.g.	  gestures),	  and	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  level	  of	  sub-­‐goal	  detail	  (Peeters	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  tool	  responses	  (Cattaneo,	  Caruana,	  Jezzini,	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  2009).	  However,	  as	  argued	  above	  even	  detailed	  or	  intransitive	  action	  modulations	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  organized	  teleologically	  around	  sensory	  outcomes	  or	  communicative	  purposes.	  Lyons	  and	  colleagues	  have	  introduced	  the	  idea	  of	  various	  levels	  of	  ‘intentional	  compression’,	  and	  hypothesized	  that	  documented	  differences	  in	  human	  and	  monkey	  sensitivities	  might	  relate	  to	  differences	  in	  what	  can	  count	  as	  a	  ‘goal’	  or	  a	  meaningful	  outcome,	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  difference	  in	  whether	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  by	  goal-­‐directed	  intentional	  actions.	  They	  write:	  	   …one	   of	   the	   potential	   benefits	   of	   construing	   behavior	   in	   intentional	   terms	   is	   that	  doing	   so	   might	   facilitate	   more	   concise	   representation:	   rather	   than	   encoding	   the	  complicated	  visual	  features	  of	  an	  action	  sequence,	  the	  sequence	  can	  be	  compressed	  to	   a	   simpler	   description	   of	   the	   underlying	   intention.	   Although	   such	   ‘intentional	  compression’	  would	  be	  advantageous	  in	  many	  ways,	  as	  with	  any	  computational	  data	  compression	  algorithm	  the	  disadvantage	   is	   that	   information	  might	  be	   lost.	  Thus,	   if	  mirror	   neurons	   are	   attuned	   to	   the	   intentional	   structure	   of	   behavior,	   it	   is	   possible	  that	   non-­‐human	   primates	   might	   simply	   be	   unable	   to	   encode	   lower-­‐level	   visual	  details	  of	  observed	  actions.	  (Lyons,	  Santos,	  &	  Keil,	  2006,	  p.	  232)	  	  Lyons	  and	  colleagues	  thus	  suggest	  that	  if	  you	  have	  intentional	  organization	  at	  some	  level	  of	  abstraction/generalization	  then	  lower-­‐level	  visual	  details	  might	  be	  unavailable.	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Additionally,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  mutually	  determining	  relation	  between	  what	  can	  be	  intended	  and	  what	  can	  count	  as	  a	  level	  of	  compression.	  Visual	  details	  might	  accordingly	  be	  available	  for	  some	  sub-­‐cortical	  circuits	  but	  fail	  to	  be	  differentiated	  as	  intentional	  goals—i.e.	  they	  may	  not	  be	  tracked	  as	  differentiated	  teleological	  units	  for	  cortical	  sensorimotor	  planning	  purposes.	  Given	  this	  ‘intentional	  compression’	  idea,	  one	  could	  further	  hypothesize	  that	  we	  might	  only	  be	  capable	  of	  intentional	  performance	  of	  actions	  that	  has	  been	  thus	  compressed	  in	  terms	  of	  cortical	  organization	  and	  possibly	  action-­‐outcome	  expectations	  [15].	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  actions	  cannot	  be	  organized	  at	  many	  levels	  in	  the	  same	  subject,	  but	  merely	  that	  there	  might	  be	  granularities	  in	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  kinds	  of	  action	  meanings	  that	  are	  not	  available	  to	  certain	  species	  or	  individuals.	  [16]	  	  The	  developmental	  psychologist	  Gergely	  Csibra	  has	  made	  some	  points	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  Lyons	  et	  al.,	  as	  he	  has	  argued	  that	  motor	  processes	  always	  ‘emulates’	  actions	  at	  some	  level	  of	  abstraction	  rather	  than	  serving	  as	  precise	  ‘mirrors’	  or	  imitators.	  Interestingly	  however	  Csibra,	  as	  opposed	  to	  Lyons	  and	  colleagues,	  sees	  this	  goal	  modulation	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  the	  role	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  circuits	  in	  goal	  and	  intention	  understanding.	  A	  key	  factor	  in	  Csibra’s	  argument	  concerns	  how	  sensorimotor	  abstraction	  and	  motor	  simulation	  are	  conceptualized	  and	  whether	  one	  thinks	  that	  such	  processes	  can	  underlie	  the	  understanding	  of	  action	  goals	  beyond	  one’s	  own	  motor	  repertoire.	  Csibra	  seems	  to	  presume	  that	  all	  motor	  processes	  are	  simulative	  and	  much	  like	  a	  covert	  version	  of	  an	  actual	  chosen	  and	  executed	  action	  (i.e.	  action	  minus	  execution).	  [17]	  He	  then	  reasons	  that	  action	  mirroring	  must	  be	  a	  ‘goal-­‐to-­‐action’	  process	  where	  actions	  are	  matched	  at	  some	  specific	  level	  of	  description	  followed	  by	  a	  detailed	  covert	  simulation.	  The	  idea	  that	  sensorimotor	  processes	  could	  encode	  or	  simulate	  any	  action	  beyond	  our	  action	  repertoire	  is	  dismissed	  a	  priori.	  Referring	  to	  a	  2005	  study	  by	  Ferrari	  et	  al.	  showing	  that	  some	  monkey	  premotor	  mirror	  neurons	  can	  be	  trained	  with	  purely	  perceptual	  exposure	  to	  respond	  to	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  with	  tools	  that	  are	  not	  in	  the	  monkey’s	  own	  motor	  repertoire.	  Csibra	  concludes:	  	   …MNs	  responded	  to	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  non-­‐executable	  action	  with	  a	  different	  action	  that	  the	   monkey	   could	   have	   used	   to	   achieve	   the	   same	   goal.	   This	   is	   exactly	   what	   the	  emulation	  model	  of	  action	  mirroring	  predicts	  for	  observed	  actions	  whose	  goals	  are	  
interpreted	  outside	   the	  motor	   system	  and	   then	   fed	   into	   the	  observer’s	  action	  control	  
system	  for	  reconstruction.	  (Csibra,	  2007,	  p.446.	  My	  italics)	  	  Csibra	  thus	  stresses	  that	  goals	  are	  understood	  first	  and	  then	  serve	  as	  the	  input	  ‘fed	  into’	  to	  mirror	  systems	  rather	  than	  as	  their	  product.	  Curiously	  he	  and	  his	  colleague	  Gyöyrg	  Gergely	  are	  great	  advocates	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘teleological	  reasoning’	  and	  affordance	  understanding	  are	  crucial	  for	  intention	  and	  goal	  understanding,	  but	  propose	  as	  we	  see	  here	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  based	  on	  purely	  perceptual	  processes	  taking	  place	  prior	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  sensorimotor	  processes	  (Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2007).	  	  Like	  Hickok,	  Csibra	  relies	  on	  assumptions	  about	  segregated	  sensory	  and	  motor	  formats	  and	  a	  feedforward	  information-­‐processing	  model.	  Additionally	  he	  appears	  to	  hypothesize	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  systems	  always	  work	  under	  the	  same	  constraints	  as	  overtly	  chosen	  and	  executed	  actions,	  and	  therefore	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  particular	  action	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  of	  description	  happens	  prior	  to	  any	  engagement	  of	  the	  in	  essence	  always	  action	  simulating	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motor	  system	  (Csibra,	  2007).	  In	  brief,	  the	  action—and	  intention—selection	  must	  always	  happen	  before	  any	  sensorimotor	  ‘mapping’.	  Note	  that	  this	  theory	  goes	  straight	  against	  the	  evidence	  of	  multiple	  competing	  affordances	  in	  parietal	  areas	  and	  of	  parallel	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  (Cisek	  &	  Kalaska,	  2010)	  [18].	  Csibra’s	  arguments	  thus	  rely	  on	  empirically	  implausible	  assumptions	  about	  what	  sensorimotor	  processes	  can	  and	  cannot	  do.	  If	  we	  move	  away	  from	  these	  assumptions	  then	  we	  can	  agree	  with	  him	  that	  actions	  are	  emulative	  and	  organized	  around	  hierarchical	  goals,	  and	  yet	  maintain	  that	  parallel	  sensorimotor	  processes	  support	  action	  choice,	  affordances	  and	  goal	  understanding.	  	  
5.	  Goal	  modulation	  in	  the	  STS	  –	  a	  ‘purely	  perceptual’	  format?	  	  Csibra	  and	  also	  Hickok’s	  proposals	  that	  purely	  perceptual	  analyses	  underlie	  our	  goal,	  intention	  and	  ‘teleological	  reasoning’	  mechanisms	  are	  however	  not	  empirically	  unsupported.	  Well	  before	  the	  discovery	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  pre-­‐motor	  areas,	  certain	  cells	  in	  the	  Superior	  Temporal	  Sulcus	  (STS)	  were	  found	  to	  be	  modulated	  by	  complex	  visual	  stimuli	  of	  biological	  action	  including	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  and	  gaze	  direction	  (Perrett	  et	  al.,	  1985	  and	  Perrett	  et	  al.,	  1989).	  Further,	  these	  cells	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  monkey’s	  own	  movements.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  STS	  has	  consistently	  been	  hypothesized	  as	  providing	  the	  visual	  and	  non-­‐motor	  input	  for	  the	  mirror	  neurons	  mechanism.	  This	  also	  fits	  with	  the	  matching/mirroring	  metaphor,	  which	  implies	  a	  process	  of	  translation	  or	  mapping	  of	  two	  different	  pre-­‐existing	  formats	  and	  organizations,	  namely	  a	  purely	  perceptual	  and	  a	  purely	  motor	  representation	  of	  the	  same	  action.	  Thus,	  even	  defenders	  of	  the	  mirror	  theory	  of	  action	  understanding,	  generally	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  purely	  perceptual	  action	  representation	  in	  the	  STS,	  which	  might	  be	  what	  is	  ‘matched’	  in	  the	  motor	  systems	  by	  mirror	  neurons.	  Gallese	  and	  Goldman	  describe	  their	  preferred	  hypothesis	  as	  follows:	  	   The	   STS	   neurons	   would	   provide	   an	   initial	   ‘pictorial’	   description	   of	   actions	   that	  would	   be	   then	   fed	   (most	   likely	   through	   an	   intermediate	   step	   in	   the	   posterior	  parietal	  cortex)	   to	   the	  F5	  motor	  vocabulary	  where	   it	  would	  acquire	  a	  meaning	   for	  the	  individual.	  (Gallese	  &	  Goldman,	  1998,	  p.	  499)	  	  Accordingly,	  eventhough	  Goldman	  and	  Gallese	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  some	  lived	  1st	  person	  meaning	  is	  added	  by	  sensorimotor	  processes,	  they	  still	  see	  the	  STS	  as	  providing	  a	  prior	  and	  independent	  ‘pictorial’	  action	  understanding.	  Further,	  the	  background	  of	  Mishkin,	  Ungerleider,	  and	  Macko	  (1983)	  and	  Milner	  and	  Goodale’s	  (1995)	  influential	  distinctions	  between	  two	  visual	  processing	  streams	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind:	  The	  temporal	  ‘ventral	  stream’	  pertains	  to	  the	  ‘what’,	  i.e.	  the	  semantic	  understanding	  of	  the	  content	  of	  perception,	  and	  the	  parietal	  ‘dorsal	  stream’,	  supports	  the	  ‘how’	  and	  ‘where’,	  i.e.	  perception	  for	  action.	  Given	  this	  division	  and	  the	  STS	  findings	  Hickok	  argues	  as	  follows:	  	   The	   existence	   of	   other	  mechanisms	   for	   action	   understanding	   is	   a	   problem	   for	   the	  mirror	   neuron	   theory	   of	   action	   understanding	   because,	   it	   places	   action	  understanding	  on	  par	  with	   “object	  understanding.”	  Object	   responses	   in	  F5	  are	  not	  generally	   interpreted	   as	   the	   neural	   basis	   for	   object	   understanding	   (Rizzolatti	   &	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Gentilucci,	   1988),	   presumably	   because	   other	   neural	   systems	   in	   the	   ventral	   visual	  stream	   support	   object	   recognition/understanding.	   Object	   information,	   processed	  for	   “meaning”	   in	   the	   temporal	   lobe,	   can	   gain	   access	   to	   motor	   programs	   as	  appropriate	   for	   behaviors	   such	   as	   grasping,	   thus	   explaining	   the	   object	   response	  properties	  of	  F5	  cells,	  even	  though	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  objects	  is	  not	  coded	  in	  these	  motor	  areas.	  (Hickok,	  2009,	  p.7)	  	  He	  makes	  an	  analogy	  between	  action	  and	  object	  perception—mirror	  and	  canonical	  neurons—and	  argues	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  “understanding”	  might	  have	  its	  neural	  basis	  in	  the	  ventral	  stream	  and	  then	  “gain	  access	  to	  motor	  programs”	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  action	  coordination.	  Some	  problems	  with	  this	  ‘access	  to	  motor	  programs’	  interpretation	  of	  canonical	  neurons	  have	  been	  discussed	  above,	  but	  note	  here	  that	  both	  Hickok’s	  and	  Goldman	  and	  Gallese’s	  proposals	  assume	  classic	  feed-­‐forward	  processes	  over	  temporal–parietal–premotor	  areas.	  That	  is,	  both	  proposals	  ignore	  the	  many	  documented	  projections	  back	  to	  the	  STS	  from	  both	  premotor	  and	  parietal	  regions	  (Hietanen	  and	  Perrett,	  1993	  and	  Hietanen	  and	  Perrett,	  1996)—as	  well	  as	  via	  subcortical	  integration	  loops	  (Caligiore	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  question	  is	  if	  the	  goal	  processing	  in	  the	  temporal	  lope	  is	  respectively	  (1)	  prior	  to	  and	  (2)	  independent	  of	  parietal	  and	  premotor	  processes.	  To	  this	  point	  Schippers	  and	  Keysers	  used	  a	  Granger	  causality	  analysis	  of	  imaging	  data	  to	  explore	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  between	  areas	  of	  the	  ‘putative	  mirror	  system’	  within	  respectively	  the	  premotor,	  parietal	  and	  temporal	  regions.	  They	  write:	  “We	  found	  predominantly	  an	  information	  flow	  within	  the	  pMNS	  from	  premotor	  to	  parietal	  and	  middle	  temporal	  cortices”	  (Schippers	  &	  Keysers,	  2011).	  Hence	  Hickok’s	  idea	  of	  the	  STS	  as	  an	  “other	  mechanism	  for	  action	  understanding”	  seems	  to	  ignore	  the	  dynamic	  modulations	  and	  organizational	  integration	  between	  STS	  and	  fronto-­‐parietal	  regions.	  	  Beyond	  back	  propagations	  the	  findings	  that	  intrigue	  me	  most	  pertain	  to	  the	  single	  cell	  studies	  by	  Hietanen	  and	  Perrett.	  They	  did	  indeed	  find	  that	  STS	  action	  sensitive	  neurons	  were	  only	  modulated	  by	  the	  perception	  of	  actions	  of	  others,	  and	  not	  by	  the	  monkeys’	  own	  movements.	  This	  finding	  supports	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  STS	  as	  purely	  perceptual	  and	  non–motor.	  Interestingly,	  however	  they	  also	  found	  that	  these	  neurons	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  sight	  of	  own	  movements,	  and	  often	  not	  even	  to	  predictable	  visual	  consequences	  of	  own	  movements	  (Hietanen	  &	  Perrett,	  1996).	  Other	  studies	  generalized	  the	  lack	  of	  response	  to	  all	  expected	  visual	  change	  (Mistlin	  &	  Perrett,	  1990).	  How	  is	  this	  differentiation	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  expected	  and	  unexpected,	  possible?	  Can	  we	  understand	  this	  kind	  of	  differentiation	  as	  ‘purely	  sensory’?	  One	  might	  instead	  speculate	  that	  the	  activity	  in	  such	  areas	  is	  a	  product	  of	  sensorimotor	  modulation—a	  sort	  of	  subtraction	  of	  self—to	  reflect	  the	  external	  and	  surprising	  elements	  of	  perception.	  Hence,	  the	  question	  is	  in	  what	  sense	  the	  STS	  is	  ‘non-­‐motor’	  and	  ‘purely	  perceptual’?	  Hietanen	  and	  Perrett’s	  own	  findings	  appear	  to	  leave	  open	  the	  option	  that	  the	  goal-­‐organization	  in	  the	  STS	  is	  a	  product	  of	  inherently	  sensorimotor	  processes	  rather	  than	  independent	  from	  these.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  the	  translation/mapping	  notion	  of	  mirroring	  is	  dealt	  a	  significant	  blow.	  	  
6.	  Dynamic	  and	  context-­dependent	  properties	  of	  mirror	  neurons	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The	  next	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  talk	  about	  mirror	  neurons	  as	  forming	  a	  separate	  ‘mechanism’	  independent	  from	  the	  broader	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  and	  in	  particular	  apart	  from	  affordance	  functions	  and	  other	  sensorimotor	  neurons	  with	  non-­‐symmetric	  perceptual	  and	  movement	  correlated	  modulatory	  activity.	  	  A	  finding,	  which	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  goal	  level	  modulation	  of	  mirror	  neurons,	  is	  from	  the	  2001	  study	  by	  Umilta	  et	  al.	  Here	  the	  Parma	  group	  found	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  modulated	  by	  various	  hand-­‐object	  grasps,	  were	  nearly	  similarly	  modulated	  when	  the	  object	  contact	  took	  place	  behind	  an	  occluder	  and	  therefore	  was	  not	  directly	  seen	  but	  based	  on	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  an	  object	  behind	  the	  occluder.	  What	  is	  rarely	  discussed	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  many	  mirror	  neurons	  must	  be	  dynamically	  integrating	  contextual	  knowledge,	  more	  specifically	  knowledge	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  grasp-­‐affording	  object.	  How	  else	  could	  these	  cells	  show	  a	  differential	  response	  depending	  respectively	  on	  the	  unseen	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  the	  object?	  This	  and	  similar	  studies	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  serve	  as	  a	  functionally	  dynamic	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  affordance	  space	  tracking	  functions	  of	  these	  areas.	  This	  kind	  of	  finding	  empirically	  counters	  the	  idea	  that	  individual	  or	  groups	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  function	  context	  independently	  as	  automatic	  mirroring	  processes	  of	  perceived	  action	  types.	  Similarly	  one	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  differing	  mirror	  neuron	  (Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  and	  human	  population	  level	  (Iacoboni	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  modulations	  given	  actions	  toward	  a	  specific	  object	  according	  to	  the	  larger	  contextual	  clues	  of	  varying	  ‘end	  goals’	  (i.e.	  in	  the	  Fogassi	  et	  al.	  study	  of	  whether	  the	  monkey	  is	  ‘grasping	  to	  eat’	  or	  ‘grasping	  to	  place’).	  These	  studies	  have	  been	  interpreted	  as	  showing	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  wired	  as	  distinct	  ‘action	  chains’	  depending	  on	  the	  end-­‐goal	  and	  thus	  the	  larger	  intentional	  hierarchy	  (Gallese,	  2007	  and	  Rizzolatti	  and	  Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  A	  different	  interpretation	  is	  that	  these	  dynamic	  and	  hierarchical	  modulations	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  wired	  in	  chains	  but	  rather	  a	  product	  of	  the	  larger	  affordance	  space	  tracking	  and	  the	  ongoing	  dynamic	  interrelations	  between	  object	  affordances	  and	  action	  interpretations	  and	  anticipations.	  	  Such	  an	  affordance	  space	  interpretation	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  a	  recent	  study	  by	  Bach	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  which	  shows	  an	  interaction	  and	  interference	  of	  mirror	  facilitation	  when	  incongruent	  but	  irrelevant	  object	  affordances	  are	  present.	  They	  conclude:	  	   These	   findings	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   observation	   of	   another	   person’s	   actions	  automatically	   evokes	   sophisticated	   motor	   representations	   that	   reflect	   the	  relationship	   between	   actions	   and	   objects	   even	   when	   an	   action	   is	   not	   directed	  towards	  an	  object”	  (Bach	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  171).	  	  Bach	  and	  colleagues	  seem	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  their	  findings	  go	  against	  the	  caricature	  model	  of	  mirroring.	  They	  write	  that	  the	  “data	  reveal	  that	  action	  observation	  not	  only	  involves	  a	  direct	  matching	  of	  visual	  to	  motor	  features,	  but	  also	  a	  sophisticated	  integration	  of	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  body	  part	  with	  the	  affordances	  of	  the	  goal	  object”	  (Bach	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  175).	  	  
7.	  Social	  affordances	  and	  self-­other	  relational	  aspects	  of	  mirror	  neurons	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As	  mentioned,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  mirror	  metaphor	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  symmetrical	  mapping	  between	  action	  and	  perception.	  That	  is,	  caricature	  mirror	  neurons	  would	  respond	  symmetrically	  to	  (1)	  action	  stimuli	  whether	  visually	  perceived	  or	  executed,	  and	  thereby	  to	  (2)	  actions	  of	  self	  (executed)	  and	  other	  (perceived).	  However,	  already	  in	  the	  first	  publication	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  mirror	  neurons—and	  before	  the	  use	  of	  this	  term—several	  asymmetries	  where	  documented	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  In	  effect	  there	  was	  never	  much	  evidence	  of	  exact	  action-­‐perception/self-­‐other	  symmetry	  even	  within	  the	  sub-­‐group	  of	  action	  perception	  and	  execution	  modulated	  premotor	  neurons	  that	  would	  later	  be	  categorized	  and	  labeled	  as	  mirror	  neurons	  (Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  	  The	  early	  asymmetries	  included	  differences	  in	  the	  intensity	  for	  the	  modulation	  for	  execution/self	  and	  perception/other,	  differences	  that	  recently	  was	  found	  to	  be	  significant	  (Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  ‘Action	  kind’	  differences	  were	  also	  reported:	  e.g.	  a	  subset	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  would	  be	  modulated	  not	  by	  one	  action	  type,	  but	  by	  temporally	  linked	  or	  ‘logically	  connected’	  actions,	  i.e.	  a	  sight	  of	  grasping	  and	  execution	  of	  mouth	  opening.	  Another	  subset	  was	  simply	  categorized	  as	  ‘non-­‐congruent’	  as	  showing	  no	  meaningful	  relation	  between	  effective	  observed	  vs.	  executed	  actions.	  Another	  subgroup	  of	  premotor	  neurons	  were	  ‘visually	  dominant’	  but	  would	  not	  qualify	  as	  falling	  under	  the	  later	  ‘mirror	  neuron’	  label	  as	  they	  showed	  little	  modulation	  during	  action	  execution.	  The	  idea	  of	  mirroring	  was	  thus	  based	  not	  on	  all	  action	  sensitive	  neurons	  reported,	  but	  rather	  on	  two	  subgroups	  labeled	  ‘congruent’	  and	  ‘broadly	  congruent’	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  execution–observation	  modulatory	  stimuli	  overlap.	  Notably,	  ‘strictly	  congruent’	  mirror	  neurons	  made	  up	  only	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  premotor	  neurons	  classified	  as	  mirror—or	  action	  sensitive	  in	  the	  early	  studies	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992	  and	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  nearly	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  effective	  action	  types	  the	  relational	  and	  contextual	  properties	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  were	  rarely	  tested/reported	  in	  early	  studies.	  However,	  asymmetries	  have	  now	  been	  documented	  even	  within	  the	  original	  ‘strictly	  congruent’	  category.	  For	  example,	  a	  single	  cell	  study	  by	  Caggiano	  and	  colleagues	  showed	  that	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  tested	  premotor	  mirror	  neurons	  showed	  selective	  modulation	  according	  to	  whether	  the	  perceived	  action	  took	  place	  in	  the	  monkey’s	  peri-­‐personal	  space	  (within	  reach)	  or	  in	  their	  extra-­‐personal	  space	  (beyond	  reach)	  (Caggiano,	  Fogassi,	  Rizzolatti,	  Thier,	  &	  Casile,	  2009).	  The	  mirror	  neurons,	  thus	  modulated	  by	  the	  relative	  distance	  of	  other’s	  perceived	  action	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  perceiving	  monkey’s	  ability	  based	  affordance	  space,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  fit	  the	  ‘mirror	  mechanism’	  story.	  Note	  that	  originally	  perceived	  action	  types	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  mirrored	  automatically	  and	  ubiquitously.	  This	  idea	  supported	  the	  ‘agent	  neutrality’	  of	  self-­‐other	  mirroring,	  and	  was	  precisely	  thought	  to	  be	  important	  for	  how	  the	  perceiver	  could	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  action	  of	  the	  other;	  i.e.	  how	  mirroring	  could	  serve	  action	  understanding	  rather	  than	  action	  execution.	  This	  finding	  shows	  that	  many	  mirror	  neurons	  do	  not	  function	  like	  modular	  automatons	  of	  action	  recognition,	  but	  rather	  reflects	  broader	  contextual	  factors.	  	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  examples	  of	  complex	  contextual	  modulations	  in	  the	  occlusion	  study,	  which	  can	  be	  hypothesized	  as	  depending	  on	  broader	  object	  affordance	  tracking.	  Now	  we	  see	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  show	  a	  differential	  response	  given	  where	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  take	  place	  in	  the	  affordance	  space.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  that	  fronto-­‐
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parietal	  circuits	  support	  the	  tacking	  of	  others	  actions	  both	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  object	  affordances	  (Umiltà	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  perceiver	  as	  providing	  social	  affordances	  for	  interactions	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  A	  series	  of	  other	  studies,	  (monkey	  as	  well	  as	  imaging	  and	  behavioral	  studies	  of	  motor	  facilitation	  in	  humans)	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  indeed	  show	  differential	  responses	  to	  perceived	  actions	  given	  contextual	  and	  relational	  factors	  such	  as	  e.g.	  shared	  versus	  non-­‐shared	  pragmatic	  space	  and	  affordances	  (Fuljii,	  Hihara,	  &	  Iriki,	  2007),	  cooperation–competition	  (Häberle,	  Schütz-­‐Bosbach,	  Laboissière,	  &	  Prinz,	  2008)	  complementary	  vs.	  imitative	  interaction	  (Newman-­‐Norlund	  et	  al.,	  2007	  and	  van	  Schie	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  motivation	  (Cheng,	  Meltzoff,	  &	  Decety,	  2007),	  culture	  (Molnar-­‐Szakacs,	  Wu,	  Robles,	  &	  Iacoboni,	  2007),	  social	  distance	  and	  status	  (Yamakawa,	  Kanai,	  Matsumura,	  &	  Naito,	  2009),	  self-­‐other	  distinctions	  (Schütz-­‐Bosbach,	  Mancini,	  Aglioti,	  &	  Haggard,	  2006)	  as	  well	  as	  visual-­‐somatosensory	  receptive	  fields	  around	  the	  body	  of	  others	  (Ishida,	  Nakajima,	  Inase,	  &	  Murata,	  2010).	  	  
8.	  The	  social	  affordance	  space:	  beyond	  segregation	  of	  action-­perception	  function	  	  Interestingly	  Caggiano	  and	  colleagues	  do	  not	  see	  a	  need	  for	  a	  significant	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  caricature	  mirror	  theory.	  Rather	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  new	  relational	  and	  asymmetric	  modulations	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  simply	  point	  to	  an	  additional	  function	  of	  these	  neurons.	  They	  write:	  	   The	  most	  accepted	  interpretation	  of	  the	  function	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  is	  that	  they	  are	  involved	   in	   action	   understanding.	   Here,	  we	   investigated	  whether	  mirror	   neurons,	  
besides	   playing	  a	   role	   in	   this	   function,	   also	   encode	   aspects	   of	   the	   observed	   actions	  that	   are	   relevant	   to	   subsequent	   interacting	   behaviors…Although	   completely	  
irrelevant	   for	   “understanding”	  what	   the	  actor	   is	  doing,	   a	  precise	  knowledge	  of	   the	  distance	  at	  which	  the	  observed	  action	  is	  performed	  is	  crucial	  for	  selecting	  the	  most	  appropriate	  behavioral	  reaction.	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  p.	  403,	  my	  italics)	  	  In	  other	  words	  they	  seem	  to	  keep	  a	  neat	  distinction	  in	  place	  between	  knowledge	  for	  “understanding”	  (classic	  mirroring)	  and	  knowledge	  for	  action/interaction	  (new	  relational	  social	  affordance	  finding).	  Similarly	  in	  an	  otherwise	  interesting	  human	  TMS	  study	  exploring	  the	  notion	  of	  social	  affordances	  for	  interaction	  Sartori	  and	  colleagues	  also	  maintain	  the	  idea	  of	  mirroring	  and	  complementarity	  as	  two	  rather	  distinct	  and	  additive	  functions	  (Sartori,	  Cavallo,	  Bucchioni,	  &	  Castiello,	  2012).	  	  My	  hypothesis,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  is	  that	  these	  aspects	  are	  both	  procedurally	  and	  functionally	  intertwined	  in	  that	  they	  contribute	  to	  a	  common	  physical	  and	  social	  affordance	  space	  tracking	  that	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  both	  first	  person	  action	  planning	  and	  selection,	  and	  second	  and	  third	  person	  social	  understanding	  of	  the	  other	  as	  they	  navigate	  the	  shared—or	  simply	  perceived—affordance	  space.	  	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  affordance	  space	  hypothesis.	  Namely,	  that	  the	  relative	  contributions	  of	  own	  action	  plans	  and	  the	  monitoring	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  in	  the	  affordance	  space	  dynamically	  interact.	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  dynamic	  aspect	  that	  would	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explain	  the	  modulatory	  findings	  in	  regards	  to	  motivation,	  task,	  distance	  as	  well	  as	  in	  respect	  to	  different	  observational	  formats	  such	  as	  video	  versus	  live	  action	  (Shimada	  &	  Hiraki,	  2006)	  [19].	  In	  short,	  the	  additive	  interpretation	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  reciprocity,	  and	  the	  difference	  between	  2nd	  and	  3rd	  person	  action	  understanding.	  	  Another	  important	  piece	  of	  asymmetric	  evidence	  is	  the	  recent	  finding	  that	  many	  action	  sensitive	  neurons	  are	  selectively	  modulated	  by	  the	  viewpoint	  angle	  from	  which	  an	  action	  is	  seen.	  I.e.	  whether	  it	  is	  frontal	  or	  profile	  view,	  and	  also	  a	  first	  person,	  vs.	  second	  or	  third	  person	  view	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  represents	  another	  single	  cell	  example	  of	  how	  the	  visual	  properties	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  seem	  far	  from	  simple	  ‘action	  type’	  mirrors,	  and	  rather	  are	  selective	  for	  a	  range	  of	  relational	  properties	  pertaining	  to	  how	  this	  action	  relates	  to	  the	  perceiving	  individual.	  Further,	  Casilie	  and	  colleagues	  have	  used	  this	  study	  to	  hypothesize	  the	  role	  of	  perception	  of	  self-­‐movement	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  action-­‐perception	  overlap	  in	  mirror	  neurons	  (Casile	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  is	  an	  important	  hypothesis,	  which	  points	  to	  the	  largely	  ignored	  role	  of	  somatosensation	  and	  proprioception	  in	  the	  establishment	  and	  adaptation	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  possibly	  fronto-­‐parietal	  affordance	  tacking	  more	  generally	  (see	  also	  Torres	  et	  al.,	  2013	  and	  Torres	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  However,	  beyond	  this	  developmental	  role	  of	  visual	  perception	  of	  own	  movements,	  it	  seems	  that	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  angle	  of	  view	  by	  which	  actions	  are	  seen	  also	  could	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  understanding	  our	  social	  affordance	  space.	  That	  is,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  socially	  relevant	  whether	  the	  other	  is	  facing	  me	  or	  the	  other	  way,	  and	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  own	  complimentary	  action	  planning,	  but	  also	  in	  understanding	  what	  the	  other	  is	  up	  to,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  reciprocal	  relation.	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least	  various	  findings	  have	  now	  documented	  that	  we	  do	  not	  simply	  have	  a	  mirroring	  sensorimotor	  response	  to	  the	  actually	  performed	  actions	  of	  others,	  but	  often	  seem	  to	  map	  something	  like	  the	  affordances	  (Bonini	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  or	  anticipated	  sensorimotor	  outcomes	  (Ishida	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  of	  the	  other.	  In	  other	  words,	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  we	  track	  not	  only	  our	  own	  object-­‐based	  and	  social	  affordances	  but	  also	  those	  of	  others	  in	  our	  shared	  space.	  Object-­‐related	  tracking	  can	  thus	  be	  enhanced	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  capable	  other	  [20].	  This	  is	  a	  fascinating	  new	  area	  of	  sensorimotor	  research,	  which	  fits	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  a	  social	  affordance	  hypothesis,	  but	  clearly	  goes	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  separate	  and	  additive	  action	  and	  social	  understanding	  functions.	  	  
9.	  The	  social	  affordance	  space	  model:	  monitoring	  the	  shared	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  	  We	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  explicit	  discussion	  of	  the	  social	  affordance	  space	  hypothesis	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  social	  cognition.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  our	  frontoparietal	  circuits	  support	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  physical	  and	  social	  affordance	  space	  tracking	  processes.	  The	  complexity	  has	  to	  do	  with	  sub-­‐circuits	  for	  various	  limbs	  and	  respectively	  postural,	  self-­‐	  vs.	  other-­‐directed	  and	  object-­‐directed	  actions,	  gestures,	  saccades	  etc.	  However,	  the	  complexity	  also	  has	  to	  do	  with	  our	  tracking	  of	  ‘relations’	  and	  ‘contents’	  of	  the	  space	  that	  we	  are	  afforded	  to	  act	  into,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Here	  we	  have	  discussed	  the	  findings	  of	  ‘canonical’	  object	  affordance	  neurons	  and	  salience	  maps	  for	  saccades.	  Further	  there	  is	  the	  tracking	  of	  actions—of	  self	  and	  other—which	  are	  currently	  unfolding	  in	  this	  space.	  Here	  we	  have	  our	  classical	  mirror	  neuron	  findings	  along	  with	  more	  recent	  findings	  of	  asymmetric	  relational	  properties,	  and	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modulation	  in	  response	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  ones	  own	  actions,	  view	  point,	  as	  well	  as	  affordance	  tracking	  relating	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  other	  [21].	  There	  are	  thus	  many	  relational	  features,	  pertaining	  to	  action	  repertoire,	  object	  affordances,	  social	  affordances	  and	  own	  on-­‐going	  actions—which	  all	  stand	  in	  dynamic	  relations	  to	  each	  other	  and	  must	  be	  undergoing	  reciprocal	  modulation	  to	  support	  our	  mapping	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  overall	  affordance	  space.	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  functionally	  support	  affordance	  understanding	  and	  decision-­‐making	  in	  our	  actual	  current	  environment.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  affordance	  space	  as	  I	  see	  this	  affordance	  tracking	  as	  anchored	  in	  current	  and	  relatively	  concrete	  sensorimotor	  relations	  to	  this	  space.	  This	  idea	  of	  a	  present	  space	  might	  not	  be	  intuitive	  to	  all,	  and	  a	  few	  aspects	  need	  to	  be	  stressed.	  	  (1)	  Inherent	  teleology:	  As	  argued	  above,	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  organized	  by	  way	  of	  teleological	  abstraction	  and	  with	  the	  characteristic	  of	  ‘intentional	  compression’	  and	  integration	  of	  more	  near	  and	  remote	  sensory	  outcomes.	  This	  abstraction	  also	  means	  that	  we	  can	  track	  current	  affordance	  potentials,	  which	  to	  some	  extent	  go	  beyond	  our	  precise	  bodily	  position	  and	  detailed	  motor	  experience.	  	  (2)	  The	  social	  dimension:	  The	  presence	  of	  others	  in	  the	  affordance	  space	  appears	  to	  create	  a	  further	  complexity,	  as	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  we	  track	  affordances	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  body,	  peri-­‐personal	  space	  and	  known	  perception–action	  teleology	  of	  the	  other	  and	  their	  bodily	  capabilities.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  many	  parallel	  levels	  ‘intentional	  compression’	  organization	  supports	  this	  social	  perspectival	  dimension,	  as	  one	  might	  perceive	  the	  space	  through	  the	  body	  of	  the	  other	  via	  ones	  own	  somewhat	  abstracted	  sensorimotor	  teleology.	  Here	  there	  is	  some	  overlap	  to	  the	  classical	  mirror	  story,	  however	  on	  my	  model	  of	  seeing	  through	  the	  body	  of	  the	  other	  is	  always	  partial	  and	  related	  to	  the	  shared	  affordance	  space—not	  a	  full	  simulation	  of	  their	  first	  person	  perspective	  or	  their	  actual	  action.	  	  (3)	  The	  present	  affordance	  space:	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  affordance	  space	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  our	  current	  perception—i.e.	  the	  door	  as	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  it	  or	  pen	  as	  I	  am	  holding	  it	  (	  Brincker,	  2014).	  Rather,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  we	  track	  affordances	  beyond	  current	  modality-­‐dependent	  perceptions—but	  as	  still	  present	  and	  available	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  of	  our	  affordance	  trackings	  and	  movement	  potentials.	  Recall	  here	  the	  occlusion	  study	  and	  the	  modulation	  due	  to	  the	  unseen	  but	  tracked	  object	  behind	  the	  occluder.	  In	  other	  words,	  things	  and	  actions	  can	  be	  currently	  ‘present’	  as	  affordances	  in	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  continuously	  perceived.	  	  (4)	  Limitations	  of	  affordance	  tracking:	  The	  fronto-­‐parietal	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  affordance	  space,	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  what	  I	  call	  navigation	  of	  counterfactual	  spaces.	  I	  might	  e.g.	  think	  about	  what	  to	  do	  tomorrow	  after	  I	  pick	  up	  the	  kids.	  In	  this	  process	  I	  imagine	  myself	  at	  the	  bus	  stop—i.e.	  I	  place	  my	  skilled	  body	  expectations	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  space	  that	  I	  do	  not	  actually	  currently	  inhabit	  or	  have	  a	  practical	  hold	  on	  with	  my	  physical	  body,	  be	  it	  imagined	  or	  remembered.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  this	  other	  kind	  of	  navigation	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  to	  understand	  many	  “mentalizing”	  and	  “theory	  of	  mind”	  capabilities	  and	  further	  is	  likely	  supported	  by	  areas	  typically	  implicated	  in	  such	  tasks,	  as	  e.g.	  the	  default	  mode	  network.	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Thus,	  these	  sorts	  of	  processes	  are	  beyond	  the	  ‘here	  and	  now’,	  and	  beyond	  the	  sensorimotor	  functions	  I	  here	  hypothesize	  for	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits.	  [22]	  	  This	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  affordance	  space	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  new	  interpretive	  framework.	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  unknowns	  and	  questions	  that	  I	  see	  as	  empirically	  tractable	  but	  still	  unexplored,	  e.g.	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  precise	  reach	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  fronto-­‐parietal	  based	  affordance	  space.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  an	  unanswered	  and	  species-­‐specific	  question	  exactly	  how	  far	  into	  the	  extra-­‐personal	  space	  our	  current	  affordance	  space	  stretches.	  Thus,	  one	  might	  ask	  whether	  the	  front	  door	  of	  my	  house	  is	  part	  of	  my	  here	  and	  now	  space	  as	  I	  sit	  at	  my	  desk?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  might	  depend	  on	  the	  capability	  of	  my	  action	  hierarchy	  to	  command	  the	  affordance	  space	  and	  track	  distal	  elements	  as	  direct	  action	  possibilities.	  Another	  complexity	  likely	  to	  be	  clarified	  empirically	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  can	  deal	  with	  counterfactual	  or	  symbolic	  content	  within	  our	  concrete	  current	  affordance	  space.	  That	  is,	  do	  linguistic	  conversations	  primarily	  depend	  on	  counterfactual	  navigation	  (beyond	  the	  fronto-­‐parietal	  hypothesis)	  or	  are	  many	  linguistic	  expressions	  more	  akin	  to	  toddlers	  use	  of	  pretense	  play	  and	  counterfactuals	  within	  the	  here	  and	  now	  affordance	  field.	  These	  unanswered	  questions	  illustrate	  how	  the	  affordance	  space	  hypothesis	  offers	  a	  new	  perspective	  of	  core	  cognitive	  issues,	  which	  open	  up	  for	  new	  empirical	  questions.	  	  With	  this	  rough	  sketch	  of	  the	  affordance	  space	  hypothesis,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  and	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  in	  social	  cognition.	  	  
10.	  Fronto-­parietal	  contributions	  to	  social	  cognition	  	  The	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  intentional	  action	  understanding	  is	  often	  based	  upon	  the	  assumption	  that	  intentions	  are	  hidden	  mental	  states.	  Many	  reiterate	  that	  ‘prior	  intentions’	  are	  underdetermined	  by	  their	  present	  behavioral	  expression	  (e.g.	  Jacob	  &	  Jeannerod,	  2005).	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  this	  fact	  is	  used	  to	  argue	  that	  processes	  supporting	  the	  observation	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  observable	  behavior	  are	  not	  essential	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  other’s	  intentional	  and	  mental	  states.	  As	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  generally	  thought	  to	  mirror	  and	  anticipate	  the	  overt	  action	  in	  the	  concrete	  context,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  they	  are	  not	  at	  the	  core	  of	  our	  ‘mind-­‐reading’	  abilities.	  Further,	  many	  critics	  of	  mirroring	  as	  supporting	  action	  understanding	  take	  the	  affordance	  properties	  and	  asymmetric	  evidence	  discussed	  above	  to	  suggest	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  circuits	  simply	  are	  ‘for	  action’,	  as	  the	  classical	  dorsal	  stream	  hypothesis	  suggests.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  circuits	  might	  help	  us	  anticipate	  others’	  actions	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  better	  interaction	  and	  appropriate	  action	  selection,	  but	  that	  these	  circuits	  hold	  little	  promise	  of	  supporting	  more	  sophisticated	  action	  understanding	  and	  social	  cognition	  (Hickok,	  2013).	  	  Given	  an	  affordance	  space	  interpretation,	  I	  see	  the	  possibility	  space	  differently.	  One	  initial	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  neat	  distinction	  between	  hidden	  mental	  states	  and	  overt	  behavior	  is	  the	  most	  useful.	  I	  agree	  that	  the	  minds	  of	  others	  always	  transcend	  my	  current	  perception,	  i.e.	  there	  are	  always	  aspects	  of	  others	  mental	  life	  that	  is	  perceptually	  unavailable—also	  when	  the	  other	  is	  present	  in	  a	  shared	  affordance	  space.	  In	  a	  sense	  this	  is	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  minded	  creature	  and	  to	  know	  that	  one	  is	  facing	  another	  minded	  creature,	  namely	  that	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not	  everything	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  present.	  However,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  see	  how	  the	  affordance	  space	  hypothesis	  brings	  in	  alternative	  categories,	  which	  go	  beyond	  concrete	  bodies	  and	  hidden	  minds.	  If	  my	  proposal	  is	  right	  then	  the	  fronto-­‐parietal	  areas	  are	  deeply	  teleologically	  organized—and	  thus	  any	  modulation	  of	  these	  areas	  to	  some	  extent	  takes	  us	  beyond	  the	  present	  and	  the	  actual	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  possible	  and	  potential.	  Sensorimotor-­‐based	  perception	  thus	  allows	  the	  perceiving	  agent	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  concretely	  given	  as	  these	  experience	  integrating	  processes	  can	  alert	  us	  to	  the	  potential	  futures	  nestled	  in	  the	  concrete	  present.	  Notably,	  potentialities	  are	  anchored	  in	  present	  intentional	  actions	  and	  affordance	  structures.	  But	  the	  ‘present’	  situation	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  momentary	  temporal	  time	  slice,	  but	  rather	  an	  ongoing	  experienced	  environment	  and	  our	  evolving	  teleological	  tracking	  of	  it.	  Accordingly,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  occlusion	  study,	  some	  pre-­‐motor	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  by	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  intentional	  context.	  Similarly,	  the	  studies	  by	  Fogassi	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  and	  Iacoboni	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  indicate	  that	  many	  parietal	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  broader	  intentional	  context	  and	  thereby	  a	  judgment	  about	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  action	  observed.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  fronto-­‐parietal	  circuits	  are	  not	  just	  modulated	  by	  overt	  behavior,	  but	  monitoring	  and	  judging	  the	  present	  environment	  given	  both	  prior	  and	  contextual	  knowledge.	  Further,	  we	  do	  not	  only	  monitor	  our	  own	  affordance	  relations	  to	  this	  present	  action	  space,	  but	  also	  how	  others	  appear	  in	  this	  space	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  their	  own	  and	  our	  shared	  affordances	  in	  it.	  We	  perceive	  not	  only	  the	  actual	  actions	  that	  others	  perform,	  but	  rather	  we	  perceive	  them	  as	  they	  make	  their	  action	  selections.	  We	  see	  both	  the	  options	  and	  the	  decisions	  made.	  We	  might	  see	  what	  they	  could	  have	  done	  but	  didn’t	  do,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  they	  might	  do,	  and	  in	  reciprocal	  scenarios	  we	  even	  see	  what	  we	  could	  do	  to	  make	  them	  do	  something	  else.	  	  As	  we	  perceive	  and	  relate	  to	  others	  the	  affordance	  space	  understanding	  accordingly	  seem	  to	  take	  on	  a	  profound	  level	  of	  social	  knowledge.	  The	  mirror	  focus	  on	  the	  actually	  performed	  actions	  misses	  the	  larger	  picture—it	  misses	  the	  point	  that	  fronto-­‐parietal	  areas	  might	  support	  how	  we	  see	  others	  think,	  evaluate,	  deliberate,	  explore,	  poke,	  manipulate,	  ignore	  and	  chose.	  Further,	  most	  of	  the	  social	  meanings	  in	  a	  shared	  space	  are	  not	  only	  observed	  from	  a	  third	  person	  perspective	  but	  as	  a	  second	  person	  interlocutor.	  This	  mutual	  reciprocity	  serves	  as	  a	  crucial	  source	  of	  social	  affordances;	  the	  key	  being	  that	  it	  is	  an	  ongoing	  and	  open-­‐ended	  morphable	  affordance	  source.	  We	  constantly	  interrogate,	  guide	  and	  manipulate	  each	  other’s	  actions	  and	  action	  choices	  through	  language,	  gaze,	  gestures	  and	  goal-­‐directed	  and	  other	  intentional	  actions.	  Our	  own	  actions	  do	  not	  only	  reveal	  ourselves	  to	  the	  perceiving	  other	  but	  the	  reciprocity	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  purposively	  set	  the	  constraints	  that	  furthers	  the	  understanding	  (De	  Jaegher,	  Di	  Paolo,	  &	  Gallagher,	  2010).	  Many	  of	  our	  more	  spontaneous,	  non-­‐intentional	  and	  automatically	  driven	  movements—e.g.	  the	  posture	  adjustments	  in	  emotional	  contagion—are	  also	  important	  for	  this	  social	  reciprocity	  and	  our	  judgment	  of	  the	  others’	  emotions,	  sensitivities,	  social	  capabilities,	  status	  etc.	  Given	  the	  teleological	  organization	  found	  in	  fronto-­‐parietal	  areas	  I	  speculate	  however,	  that	  such	  processes	  are	  largely	  unconscious	  and	  might	  primarily	  depend	  on	  subcortical	  processes	  (Torres,	  2011).	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In	  terms	  of	  understanding	  the	  intentions	  of	  others,	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  affordance	  space	  tracking	  allows	  us	  a	  significant	  but	  always	  partial	  view.	  I	  cannot	  now	  understand	  all	  your	  intentions	  based	  on	  our	  current	  shared	  affordance	  space.	  But	  in	  so	  far	  as	  your	  behavior,	  bodily	  capabilities	  and	  contextual	  agency	  is	  perceptually	  available	  and	  we	  share	  an	  affordance	  space,	  I	  do	  see	  many	  of	  your	  intentional	  options	  and	  choices	  and	  your	  mind	  is	  by	  no	  means	  entirely	  hidden	  or	  imperceptible.	  Further,	  the	  partial	  nature	  of	  the	  access	  to	  the	  minds	  of	  others	  is	  itself	  is	  a	  sort	  negative	  and	  situated	  knowledge	  and	  therefore	  often	  presents	  a	  social	  affordance	  of	  dynamic	  interrogation—which	  if	  resisted	  of	  course	  in	  itself	  presents	  us	  with	  new	  perceptible	  social	  knowledge.	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1. I shall for reasons of simplicity refer to this group of researchers collectively as “the Parma group”. 
2. The discovery of mirror neurons has indeed been one of the most influential events in neuroscience in 
recent decades. Ramachandran has perhaps been the least shy about his expectations, as he hypothesized 
that “mirror neurons will do for psychology what DNA did for biology” (2000). Ferrari and Rizzolatti write 
on the question why the notion of mirror neurons has had such an impact across fields: “Two reasons are 
the most likely. The first is that their discovery put the problem of how we understand others at the 
forefront of neuroscience. The second is that, by showing that mirror neurons were basically motor 
neurons, they suggested a rather unexpected solution to this problem: the motor system is involved in 
understanding the actions and intentions of others.” (Ferrari & Rizzolatti, 2014) 
3. Susan Hurley has famously dubbed this cognitivist information processing view “the classical sandwich” as 
cognitive processes are conceived as sandwiched between input and output modules (Hurley, 1998). I shall 
in the following refer to this view as either the sandwich or input–output view. 
4. E.g. there is a wide range of evidence that multisensory-motor integration and pragmatic and spatial 
functions depends on parietal areas, whereas e.g. object and facial recognition depend on temporal areas 
(Milner & Goodale, 1995). 
5. See also Dewey’s (1896) classic critique of sensorimotor segregation and simple feedforward analyses. 
6. See also Gallagher, 2008, Gallagher, 2007 and Zahavi, 2008 for a critique of simulative interpretations of 
mirror neurons and the assumption that intentions cannot be perceived. 
7. This article focuses narrowly on the properties of the cortical parts of circuits related to goal-directed limb 
actions. The larger issues and literatures relevant to sensorimotor organization are enormous, and many 
important issues will be left aside. Most criminally I shall bracket the issues of how development, and 
adaptation of these circuits relates to their sub-cortical basal ganglia, thalamic and cerebellar connections, 
and thereby inadvertently continue the prevalent “current dualism of peripheral and central structures and 
functions” (Dewey, 1896), which needs its own re-interpretation (Brincker & Torres, 2013). Further, 
beyond fronto-parietal limb circutis three other parallel cortical-basal ganglia-thalamic loops has been 
reported, pertaining to emotional and sensorimotor response navigation in respectively limbic/temporal, 
pre-frontal and facial fronto-parietal cortical areas (Purves et al., 2012). These show differences in function 
and maturation, as well as different levels of plasticity and associative vs. genetically based organization 
(Casile et al., 2011 and Heyes, 2010). Further I follow the current literature and focus entirely on the 
observation of intentional and goal-directed actions, though more spontanious action segments (Torres, 
2011) also are very important to social cognition and inparticular emotional judgements. Lastly, I shall also 
ignore many of the complexities in comparing single cell studies of macaque monkeys and behavioral and 
imaging studies, which supply the main human data (Brincker, 2010 and Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 
2008). Hopefully these simplifications will be justified in the context of the overall project of highlighting 
basic integrative and teleological features of sensorimotor processes, and how current findings challenge 
core theoretical assumptions. 
8. A separate analysis is needed for the bayessian predictive coding account preseted e.g. Kilner et al. (2007) 
as this theory breaks the classical input–output frame in interesting ways. How this account might be seen 
as compatible and incompatible with the social affordance view presented here decerves careful attention in 
the future. However, theorists like Hickok, Jacob, and Csibra appear to combine a classical input–output 
frame with the idea that mirror neuron processes can serve as internal simulators that help us anticipate 
action outcomes, which then can serve as additive information for “purely perceptual” goal and action 
understanding mechanisms. 
9. For present purposes I shall not argue for or against but just highlight that the mirror neuron literature often 
simply assumes the imperceptibility of intention. This idea might seem intuitive precisely due to 
assumptions about separate sensory and motor systems and a notion of intentions as mental states, which 
can be neatly distinguished from sensorimotor processes (e.g. Spaulding, 2015). Debates over the 
perceptibility of intentions also show the usefulness of a discussion of whether sensorimotor affordance 
perception and integrative tracking can be seen as part of the percetual process or as a later and more 
additive component (see also Gallagher, 2008). 
10. I here follow the way the affordance concept has been used by researchers, though this use in many ways is 
inconsistent and theoretically wanting. See Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) for an excellent recent 
discussion and reinterpretation of the affordance concept. Following their analysis we might want to say 
that what is being tracked by ‘canonical’ neurons and similar sensorimotor processes are affordance 
solicitations rather than affordances per se. 
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11. For the motor/sensorimotor rather than merely perceptual role in such parallel target and affordance 
tracking see also Stewart, Gallivan, Baugh, & Flanagan, 2014. 
12. See here also Elizabeth Torres’ recent re-interpretation and applications of the concept of re-afference 
(Torres and Choi, 2014, Torres et al., 2014 and Torres et al., 2013). The two most recent articles are 
incredibly important for the question of not only sensory feedback in general for intentional and 
teleological action organization in parietal cortex but the specific role of proprioception. A future and fuller 
social affordance framework would have to include an analysis of proprioception, interoception and the 
role of body schemas in fronto-parietal circuits. 
13. Kilner and collegeagues seem with their ‘predictive coding’ account to avoid the feedforward aspect of the 
classical sandwich by not even talking about perceptions and action choices but merely about “predictions” 
and “prediction errors” (Kilner et al., 2007). Their computational model of error minimization relies on a 
preset hierarchy of modules and one question is how to model an autonomous acting and perceiving system 
given such constraints. However as mentioned a satisfying negotiation between the predictive coding 
model and the affordance model is beyond my current scope. 
14. Neurons have for example often been categorized as ‘motor dominant’ without controlling for 
somatosensory and proprioceptive modulation. 
15. Torres (2011) documented systematic kinesthetic differences in target-directed vs. spontaneous withdrawl 
movements. Such differences can be hypothesized as being due to involvement of different cortical and 
subcortical processes. 
16. As Michael Wheeler (2010) has argued, humans might be particularly contextually ‘plastic’, flexible and 
adaptive in their behavior and in what can come to count as a goal as compared to other species. 
17. Mark Jeannerod (2006) wrote a book about motor cognition based on this simulative definition. See also 
Brincker, 2010 and Brincker, 2012 for critical discussion of this view. 
18. This is by no means the only empirical inconsistency for Csibra and other theorists with a narrow view of 
the motor system. A range of other sensorimotor findings of e.g. viewer independent object shape 
perception in the dorsal stream (Konen & Kastner, 2008) seem in need of some explanation that goes 
beyond action simulation. 
19. See also Brincker (2015) for theoretical discussion. 
20. Note that the very division between canonical neurons as related to object affordances and mirror neurons 
as related to action mirroring breaks down under the social affordance model and a much more messy and 
heterogeneous array of teleological sensory motor neurons are predicted by the model (Brincker, 2010), 
which also fits with above mentioned asymmetric affordance space related mirror neuron propoties 
(Caggiano et al., 2009) as well as e.g. recent findings of “canonical mirror neurons” (Bonini et al., 2014). 
21. See also Footnote 20. 
22. For a discussion of the distinction and development of the ability to navigate the ‘here and now’ versus 
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